Grok Build apps exposed: 35,578 open with no sign-in
Security firm Claroc found 35,578 Grok Build apps open with no sign-in. The link is not a secret: DNS records it. Audit each AI-built app your team published.
"Anyone with the link" is only safe if nobody can find the link. For Grok Build apps, anybody can. Security firm Claroc listed more than 43,000 app addresses under grok.me and opened 35,578 of them with no sign-in. Some held patient data, staff rosters and SpaceXSI's own sales documents. If your team builds internal tools with an AI app builder, this is your audit trigger.
What actually happened
Claroc's research post, dated November 10, gives the mechanism. Grok's Build mode publishes each app at its own address, <name>.grok.me. Grok proposes four random words for the name. That looks like a secret. It is not, because the name is a hostname. Each time somebody opens the app, DNS looks up the name, and passive DNS services record the lookup. Anybody with an account can search *.grok.me.
Shared chat links from other AI products put the random part in the URL path. DNS does not see a path.
Claroc's numbers:
- 43,601 names listed under
grok.me - 37,571 still online
- 35,578 open without sign-in, which is 94.7%
- About 2% held material Claroc rated high or critical
- 30 organizations other than SpaceXSI and X, 26 with more than 1,000 employees and 6 in the Fortune 500
Examples: a hospital group's roster of more than 3,500 employees, an ICU briefing for one patient, a fire department shift board with names and badge numbers, and a timesheet app with 18 accounts and plain-text passwords in its code. Claroc also found 24 open apps built by SpaceXSI and X staff, including a map of 594 strategic sales accounts.
The cause is a default. Claroc says the publish panel offers "Anyone with the link", "Invited users" and "Only you", with the first one already selected. SpaceXSI told a reporter that apps are private until the creator shares them and that publishing takes several steps. Per Claroc and Engadget, SpaceXSI took down its own 24 apps and did not take down other users' apps. The default did not change.
Why exposed Grok Build apps matter for your business
Your staff do this now. Somebody in operations builds a schedule board in ten minutes, puts real names in it, and publishes it for the team. We saw the same pattern when Claude share links got indexed. The builder is not the problem. The unowned, unlisted app is.
Do these four checks:
- Ask your team which AI builders they use. Grok Build, Lovable, Replit, all of them.
- Open each published app in a private window. A stranger must get an error page.
- Set Grok apps to "Invited users" or "Only you". Then test sign-in with an account from outside the company. Claroc found that one "Continue with Google" setup let in any Google account.
- Unpublish the apps that have no owner. Claroc says a
grok.meapp goes offline in seconds.
And one rule: an app with real customer or staff data needs a login you control, on a domain you own.
Key takeaways
- Claroc found 35,578 Grok Build apps open with no sign-in, 94.7% of those online
- The four-word name is a hostname, so passive DNS records it
- "Anyone with the link" was the preselected option at publish, per Claroc
- Exposed data included patient, staff and SpaceXSI sales records
- List each AI-built app your team published and test it from outside
A ten-minute app is fine for a prototype. It is not where your staff roster lives. We turn the tools your team hacked together into software with real sign-in, on infrastructure you own. See what we have built, or tell us which app worries you.
Sources: Claroc Research, Engadget.
- #grok-build
- #vibe-coding
- #data-exposure
- #passive-dns
- #ai-app-builders
Tommy Rush — Founder, Rush Commerce
Operator turned builder. 15+ years running operations — now shipping the systems businesses run on. More
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