ESXi ransomware wiped 4 hosts and backups with no exploit
Kaspersky documents an ESXi ransomware attack that destroyed four hosts, both vCenters and all backups in 10 days with stolen credentials. Split your backup admin.
This ESXi ransomware attack used no software bug. Kaspersky's incident response team published the case on November 13. In 10 days, an attacker destroyed four ESXi hosts, every virtual machine on them, both vCenter Server Appliances and all connected backup infrastructure. Kaspersky found no guest-to-host escape and no hypervisor memory corruption. The attacker logged in with real credentials and used the admin tools the way an admin does.
What actually happened
The report comes from Kaspersky's Global Emergency Response Team (GERT). The ransom notes named the BlackNevas group, first seen in November 2024. The sequence:
- Credentials came from other systems. Kaspersky says credentials "obtained from non-virtualization systems" inside the perimeter were used to reach vCenter. The report does not state the very first foothold.
- Root SSH on vCenter, then persistence. The attacker logged in to the disaster-recovery vCenter as root. Forty-three seconds later, a script installed MeshAgent, a remote management tool. About four hours later, they added the Ligolo-ng tunnel as a systemd service with a VMware-style name.
- Host Profiles turned on SSH. The attacker used the vCenter Host Profile workflow to enable SSH on the ESXi hosts. That took eleven minutes. The SSH logins then came from the vCenter IP address, which the hosts trust.
- Backups went first. Days before the main attack, the attacker disabled antivirus on the backup environment and extracted stored credentials. Then they stopped the backup services and encrypted the recovery infrastructure. All of that happened before the ESXi payload ran.
- A test, then the wipe. The payload ran a 16-second self-test about three hours before the final run. On one host, all VMs stopped within 23 seconds. About the first 2 KB of each virtual disk file was overwritten.
Why this ESXi ransomware case matters for your business
You do not need four ESXi hosts for this to apply. If one login can reach your servers and your backups, you have the same design.
Patches did not help here. Patch anyway. But this attacker needed no vulnerability. The weak point was shared credentials between ordinary IT systems and the virtualization layer.
Your backup is a target, not a safety net. The attacker destroyed recovery before production. Kaspersky's advice is to make backups a separate security boundary: separate admin accounts, minimal domain dependency, immutable copies that production credentials cannot touch, and restore tests that assume vCenter and Active Directory are gone.
Trusted admin traffic hides attacks. SSH from vCenter to a host looks normal. Kaspersky recommends that you treat vCenter as Tier 0: dedicated admin identities, phishing-resistant MFA, and alerts when SSH turns on outside an approved window.
Send logs off the box. ESXi keeps logs on a ramdisk. Kaspersky warns against a reboot only to remove the attacker, because it can destroy those logs. Configure remote syslog to storage outside the virtualization environment before you need it.
If an MSP runs your servers, ask three questions. Do the backup admin accounts differ from the domain admin accounts? Is one backup copy immutable? When was the last full restore test without the production directory?
Key takeaways
- Kaspersky GERT documented a 10-day intrusion that destroyed four ESXi hosts, both vCenter appliances and all connected backups
- No virtualization vulnerability was exploited; the attacker used stolen credentials and standard VMware management features
- The attacker used Host Profiles to enable SSH on the hosts in eleven minutes
- Backup antivirus, services and repositories were disabled or encrypted before the main attack
- Use separate backup admin accounts, keep one immutable copy, and test a restore that assumes vCenter and AD are down
If one password reaches your servers and your backups, you have one system, not two. We build and audit infrastructure where the recovery path has its own accounts, its own storage and a restore test with a date on it. See how we build systems that can be restored, or tell us how your backups work today.
Sources: Kaspersky Securelist.
- #esxi-ransomware
- #vmware
- #backups
- #blacknevas
- #security
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