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Commerce & Retail Tech3 min read

Optimizely hack put a card skimmer on 178 big websites

The Optimizely Web Experimentation hack served a card skimmer and crypto stealer from its own CDN. What store owners should audit in their third-party scripts.

The Optimizely hack turned an A/B testing tool into a card skimmer. On Monday, November 16, an attacker used a hole in Optimizely's Web Experimentation product to plant malicious JavaScript in customer projects. Visitors to at least 178 organizations got malware served from Optimizely's own CDN, Help Net Security reports. The list includes the BBC, CNN, Zoom, IKEA and Salesforce. None of those sites had to be breached. The marketing tool was enough.

What actually happened

Optimizely confirmed that "an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation" and used it to add JavaScript to some customer projects. The company says it fixed the flaw, removed the injected code and secured affected accounts, per The Register. It hasn't explained how the attacker got in.

What researcher Scott Helme of Report URI found, per Help Net Security:

  • Scale: 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely snippets his team checked carried the malware. They only checked snippets they could find in time, so the real number is likely higher.
  • Where it hid: the "Project JavaScript" field, which runs on every page that loads the snippet.
  • What it did: swapped copied crypto wallet addresses, skimmed card numbers, expiry dates and CVVs from on-page payment forms, and stole cookies and screenshots. On older iPhones and iPads it tried to deliver iOS exploit kits.
  • Who got hit most: banks and financial firms (32 organizations), then tech companies and retailers.
  • What it earned: about $7,150 in crypto. Nobody knows how many cards were taken.
  • What stopped it: card fields hosted in a payment processor's iframe were out of reach. A strict Content Security Policy helped too, but only 24 of the affected organizations had one. Allowlisting Optimizely's domain did nothing, because the malware came from that domain.

Why it matters for your business

Your checkout is only as safe as the least-watched script on the page. A/B testing, analytics, chat widgets and heatmaps usually get installed by marketing, with full access to the page. Nobody in engineering reviews them.

If you run a store, check these this week:

  • Inventory every third-party script on your product, cart and checkout pages. Remove the ones nobody uses.
  • Keep card entry in your processor's hosted fields. Stripe Elements, Shopify Checkout, Square's hosted forms. That's what saved card data in this attack.
  • Keep experimentation tools off checkout. Test your product pages. Leave the payment page alone.
  • Tighten your CSP and limit where scripts can send data. A domain allowlist alone isn't enough.
  • Lock down vendor accounts. Anyone who can edit custom JavaScript in a tool like this can edit your site.

Key takeaways

  • An Optimizely flaw let an attacker inject JavaScript into customer projects
  • At least 178 organizations served a card skimmer and crypto stealer
  • The code came from Optimizely's own CDN, so allowlists didn't help
  • Processor-hosted payment fields kept card data out of reach
  • Audit every third-party script on your checkout path

Don't know what's running on your checkout page? We audit storefronts for third-party scripts, move card entry into hosted fields, and set a Content Security Policy that blocks data leaks. Book a storefront security review or see what we build.

Sources: Help Net Security, The Register.

  • #optimizely
  • #card-skimming
  • #third-party-scripts
  • #content-security-policy
  • #ecommerce-security
TR

Tommy Rush — Founder, Rush Commerce

Operator turned builder. 15+ years running operations — now shipping the systems businesses run on. More

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