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Rush Commerce
Software & Dev3 min read

Marathon Health data breach: a fake IT call got the password

In the Marathon Health data breach, a caller posed as IT support and got one employee's password. Data left a cloud app in hours. Verify each IT support call.

The Marathon Health data breach started with a person who said they were from IT. Marathon Health operates employer-sponsored health clinics in the US. On August 24, a caller posed as a Marathon IT worker and got one employee to give up their credentials. The credentials opened a cloud-hosted application, and the data left in a few hours. No exploit was used. No patch would have stopped it.

What actually happened

The HIPAA Journal reported the facts on November 3, from the state breach notices:

  • The entry. Marathon's California notice says an unauthorized person posed as a Marathon IT worker and tricked the employee into disclosing their credentials.
  • The target. One cloud-hosted application. The notice does not name the application or a vendor.
  • The speed. Marathon saw suspicious activity on the employee account on August 24. The data was exported in the space of a few hours that same day. The review of the data ended on September 9.
  • The data. Names, contact information, dates of birth and Social Security numbers. The Texas and Vermont attorney general sites also list medical and health insurance information.
  • The count. A law firm reports that Marathon told the Texas attorney general about 5,684,735 people in total. The Texas site itself lists 234,534 Texas residents. Massachusetts lists 29,075 and Vermont lists 8,858. Treat the 5.7 million number as reported, not confirmed by Marathon.
  • The response. Letters started on October 20. Marathon offers 12 or 24 months of credit monitoring.
  • What is not known. No group has claimed the attack. The HIPAA Journal notes that the tactic matches groups such as ShinyHunters and Scattered Spider, but neither has claimed it.

One more detail matters. Marathon gets enrollment data from the employers that sponsor its clinics. Some people who got a letter possibly never visited a Marathon clinic.

Why the Marathon Health data breach matters for your business

This attack needs a phone and a confident voice. It works on a company with 5 people the same as on one with 5,000. Your staff want to be helpful to IT. The attacker uses that.

Look at the two failures. First, the employee had no procedure to confirm that the caller was IT. Second, one password was enough to export a large data set from a cloud app, and nothing stopped the export while it ran.

We wrote about the same sequence when attackers used stolen credentials to wipe ESXi hosts and backups. The login was valid, so the security tools stayed quiet.

What to do:

  1. Write one rule: IT never asks for a password or an MFA code. Tell every employee. Put it in the onboarding document.
  2. Use a call-back procedure. If "IT" calls, the employee ends the call and dials the known IT number.
  3. Use phishing-resistant MFA on cloud apps. Passkeys or hardware keys. A code that a person can read aloud is a code that a caller can get.
  4. Limit bulk export. Most staff do not need to download the full customer table. Remove that permission, and set an alert on large exports.
  5. Hold less data. Marathon held records for people who were only enrolled, not treated. Delete what you do not use.

Key takeaways

  • A caller posed as a Marathon Health IT worker on August 24 and got one employee's credentials
  • The credentials opened a cloud-hosted application, and data was exported in a few hours
  • Exposed data includes names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers and, per state sites, medical and insurance information
  • About 5.7 million people is the reported total; the state sites confirm smaller state counts
  • Set a no-password rule for IT calls, a call-back procedure, phishing-resistant MFA and limits on bulk export

One password must not be enough to export your customer list. We review who can download what from your cloud apps, add export limits and alerts, and build internal tools with least-privilege access from the start. Ask us for an access review, or see how we build systems you own.

Sources: The HIPAA Journal.

  • #marathon-health
  • #data-breach
  • #social-engineering
  • #help-desk
  • #cloud-security
TR

Tommy Rush — Founder, Rush Commerce

Operator turned builder. 15+ years running operations — now shipping the systems businesses run on. More

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